Workshop: January 29-31, 2012
Risk analysis and assessment
Risk analysis and assessment of hazardous activities is the first step in setting up an effective management system to ensure an adequate level of safety. Different techniques and methodologies were developed for this purpose going from check lists through master logic diagram to probability risk analysis. For the workshop we invite contributions demonstrating the application of techniques and methodologies in the risk assessment of hazardous activities of different scale from the workplace risk assessment to the risk assessment of large installations or infrastructures.
Safety and safety culture
In a context of complex and potentially hazardous activities, guaranteeing an adequate level of safety is a major preoccupancy of all stakeholders (managers, decision makers, regulators, population). Within the nuclear sector, the analysis of the Chernobyl disaster raised awareness of the need of an adequate level of safety culture to avoid major accidents. However, in other sectors such as the chemical industry or air transport, the concept is used and developed as well. Though there is a lot of literature and guidance on the issue of safety in relation to safety culture, there a need for clarification: How to assess safety culture? Which factors constitute safety culture? How to manage and enhance safety culture? The workshop will address theoretical concepts as well as practical case studies, where we will benefit from the synergy of different sectors like chemical, nuclear, ….
Security and security culture
Security, in comparison with safety, places additional emphasis on deliberate acts that are intended to cause harm. Dealing with deliberate intentions, such as sabotage, extortion or unauthorised removal of materials, requires different approaches in the risk analysis, the response planning and the mitigation strategies, and different attitudes and behaviour of the stakeholders, such as confidentiality of information and efforts to deter malicious acts. Security culture and safety cultures are largely based on common principles such as questioning attitudes, rigorous and prudent approaches, effective and open two way communications, and they refer both to characteristics and attitudes of individuals and organisations. In this workshop we address the same research questions as for safety and safety culture: How to assess security culture? Which factors constitute security culture? How to manage and enhance security culture? And also more specific security challenges: how to balance confidentiality with the need for transparency, how to balance a questioning attitude with trust?
Safety & Security by design
Safety and security by design starts from the concept that safety and security should play an integral role in the design process of a facility. It is a risk-informed approach, requiring a well-defined safety & security strategy and a multi-disciplinary approach. It cannot be implemented solely by design engineers, risk assessors or safety/security managers but requires a commitment from everybody involved to make safety and security a primary design. It also requires a coordinated approach by all parties, including design engineering, operators, project managers and regulators. In this workshop we look for contributions addressing theoretical or practical aspects related to the implementation of this concept.
Human factors
Implementing the three elements of Human Factors (organisational, task-related and individual factors) in an organisation leads to an optimisation of procedures and work processes. For the radiation protection in the nuclear sector this means an optimisation of the Alara-principle. Errors are an important source of information on Human Factors and by in-depth investigation of incidents and errors organisations can learn a lot about their processes and organisation. This workshop will address theoretical and practical implementation of the ergonomic principles into an organisation. Furthermore it will be an opportunity to discuss and exchange information about the “human contribution” to incidents and errors both in the nuclear industry and in other sectors. Can we identify common elements in incidents typical for the nuclear industry? And what can we learn from other industries?
Safeguards information analysis
The strengthened safeguards regime based on the Additional Protocol makes among others use of the analysis of open source information to verify that no undeclared activities are undertaken in a State. Open source information contains all kinds of data with different degrees of reliability and relevance. Analysis of open source information is currently performed by senior IAEA inspectors without a rigorous procedure in place. Open source information analysis based on a more systematic, computerized methodology would improve the reliability and speed of the analysis and moreover reduce the manpower that is now spent on the analysis. The workshop will address the pros and cons of different methodologies that can be applied for analysis of data series with variable reliability and relevance.
Computerized tools
Illustrations and demonstrations for all standard (e.g., statistics), newly developed (e.g., Artificial Intelligence and decision support systems) and hybrid (e.g., various standard and AI related) methodologies to the workshop topics are all welcome. Software tools from PhD, postdoc, or current national, EU, international projects related to the workshop topics are especially expected with structurally sound and accurate results, reliable with repeatable and robust results, user-friendly, and transparent.